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Introduction 
 
The market for grid-connected 
photovoltaics (PV) in the US has 
grown dramatically in recent years, 
driven in large part by PV grant or 
“buy-down” programs in California, 
New Jersey, and many other states.  
The recent announcement of a new 
11-year, $3.2 billion PV program in 
California suggests that state policy 
will continue to drive even faster 
growth over the next decade.  
Federal policy has also played a 
role, primarily by providing 
commercial PV systems access to 
tax benefits, including accelerated 
depreciation (5-year MACRS 
schedule) and a business energy 
investment tax credit (ITC). 
 
With the signing of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) on 
August 8, the federal government is 
poised to play a much more 
significant future role in supporting 
both commercial and residential PV 
systems.  Specifically, EPAct 
increased the federal ITC for 
commercial PV systems from 10% 
to 30% of system costs, and also 
created a new 30% ITC (capped at 
$2000) for residential solar systems.  
Both changes went into effect on  
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 January 1, 2006, and – absent an extension (for which the solar 
industry has already begun 
lobbying) – will last for a period of 
two years:  the new residential ITC 
will expire, and the 30% 
commercial ITC will revert back to 
10%, on January 1, 2008. 
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http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/cases/
 
or 
 
www.cleanenergystates.org
 
How much economic value do these 
new and expanded federal tax 
credits really provide to PV system 
purchasers?  And what implications 
might they hold for state/utility PV 
grant programs?  Using a generic 
(i.e., non-state-specific) cash flow 
model, this report explores these 
questions.1  We begin with a 
discussion of the taxability of PV 
                                                 
1 For an application of this model, and 
the concepts included in this report, to 
California, see Ryan Wiser and Mark 
Bolinger, “Federal Tax Incentives for 
PV:  Potential Implications for Program 
Design” 
(http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/Wiser_
Bolinger_CPUC_PV_Tax_03_2006.pdf) 
and Mark Bolinger and Ryan Wiser, 
“Calculating After-Tax Parity Under 
EPAct 2005:  Potential Implications for 
the California Energy Commission’s 
PV Rebate Levels” (forthcoming from 
the California Energy Commission). 
Case Studies of State Support for Renewable Energy                                                                  March 2006 
grants and their interaction with federal credits, 
as this issue significantly affects the analysis that 
follows.  We then calculate the incremental 
value of EPAct’s new and expanded credits for 
PV systems of different sizes, and owned by 
different types of entities.  We conclude with a 
discussion of potential implications for 
purchasers of PV systems, as well as for 
administrators of state/utility PV programs. 
 
Taxation of State Grants and 
Interaction with Federal Tax Credits 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, whether or not the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) considers grants made by 
state/utility PV programs to be taxable income is 
a critical factor in determining the value of the 
new and expanded tax credits under EPAct.2  
This is because, at least for the foreseeable 
future, most PV systems in the US are likely to 
be installed with the financial support of a 
state/utility PV program.  If the grants provided 
by these programs are considered to be taxable 
income, then a grant recipient can claim the 
federal ITC (and depreciation if a commercial 
system) on the full cost or “basis” of the system.  
If, however, the grants are not considered to be 
taxable income, then the grant recipient must 
reduce, by the amount of the grant, the basis to 
which the federal ITC (and depreciation) apply.3
                                                 
2 For earlier work on this topic, see Susan Gouchoe, 
Lynne Gillette, Christy Herig. 2004. “Are Solar 
Rebates and Grants for Homeowners and Businesses 
Taxable?” ASES SOLAR 2004 Proceedings. 
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/PolicyPublicatio
ns/Taxability_ASES_2004.pdf
3 See the conference report to the Crude Oil Windfall 
Profits Tax Act of 1980, which states that “under 
present law…if property is financed with nontaxable 
government grants, the tax basis in the property, for 
such purposes as depreciation and investment credits 
(including energy investment credits), is reduced to 
the extent that the property is financed with such 
grants.”  It goes on to explain that “grants which are 
taxable are not taken into account under these [credit 
offset] rules because their taxation serves as a partial 
offset; similarly, credits against State and local 
income taxes are not taken into account because the 
deductibility of these taxes under the Federal income 
tax implies that the effect of these credits is 
equivalent to the effect of a taxable grant.” 
As a result, the taxable or non-taxable status of 
the grant carries significant federal tax 
consequences.  PV grants frequently buy-down 
as much as 50% of installed system costs.  If 
non-taxable, such grants will cut in half not only 
the value of the federal ITC, but also the tax 
benefits of depreciation (for commercial 
systems).  The economic impact is not trivial.  
For example, under the assumptions described 
later, our cash flow model reveals that a 
residential PV system garners the same value (in 
terms of net present value of after-tax cash 
flows) from a $2.7/W non-taxable grant as it 
does from a $4/W taxable grant; conversely, it 
would take a non-taxable grant of $5.8/W to 
provide a commercial system with the same 
after-tax value as a $4/W taxable grant. 
 
This example demonstrates not only the 
magnitude of the impact, but also its disparate 
effect on residential and commercial PV 
systems.  Because of the $2000 federal ITC cap 
for residential systems (which will be binding 
for all but the smallest systems) and the absence 
of depreciation benefits, residential systems are 
better off financially with a non-taxable, rather 
than taxable, grant.  The opposite is true for 
commercial systems, which are better off paying 
income tax on the grant, and then applying the 
uncapped ITC and accelerated depreciation to 
the full basis of the project. 
 
Given the degree of economic impact at stake, 
whether or not PV grants are taxable is clearly 
an important question.4  Unfortunately, the IRS 
has provided no direct guidance on this issue.  
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code 
generally defines gross (taxable) income to 
mean income derived from any source, except as 
otherwise provided in statute.  The IRS broadly 
interprets this definition to treat government 
grants as taxable income unless statutorily 
excluded from taxation. 
 
                                                 
4 Though a useful and otherwise thorough reference 
document, the March 2006 Solar Energy Industries 
Association’s (SEIA) “Guide to Federal Tax 
Incentives for Solar Energy (Version 1.1)” does not 
directly address this question.  For more information, 
see http://www.seia.org/manualdownload.php. 
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Though this suggests that PV grants should 
generally be considered taxable, four possible 
grounds for exclusion from taxable income 
might be explored.  Specifically, a PV grant 
would be considered non-taxable if it were 
found to be one of the following:  (1) a 
government social welfare payment; (2) a 
manufacturer or dealer rebate of the purchase 
price; (3) a contribution to the capital of a 
corporation; or (4) a utility energy conservation 
subsidy.  Below we discuss each of these 
possibilities in turn, focusing in particular on 
what appears to be the most relevant potential 
exclusion – the possibility that a PV grant might 
qualify as a utility energy conservation subsidy.5
 
Government Social Welfare Payments:  While 
broadly defining taxable income to cover 
government grants, the IRS as a matter of public 
policy has created an exclusion for government 
welfare payments to individuals.  In order to be 
non-taxable, however, such payments must be 
based on the recipient’s established need.  Since 
few if any PV programs require grant recipients 
to establish need, this exclusion is not 
particularly applicable (one possible exception 
might be PV grants offered specifically to low-
income households). 
 
Manufacturer or Dealer Rebate of the 
Purchase Price:  Certain reductions in the 
purchase price of an asset may be considered 
non-taxable.  In Technical Advice Memorandum 
8924002, the IRS reviewed its past revenue 
rulings and concluded that “in order for the 
receipt of funds to be considered a non-taxable 
price rebate that reduces the basis of an item of 
property, several features must be present:  (1) 
the rebate must be based on the purchase price 
of the item; (2) the manufacturer or dealer of the 
item must be the party offering the rebate; and 
(3) the recipient must be able to negotiate or 
renegotiate the purchase price in an arms-length 
transaction. ...therefore, a [non-taxable] rebate is 
treated as a reimbursement of the purchase price 
and not an accession to wealth.”   
 
                                                 
                                                
5 The tax analysis that follows does not take into 
account, and may not be applicable to, third-party-
owned PV systems. 
Most PV programs fail to meet at least the first 
two requirements for this price rebate exclusion.  
Specifically, most programs base their grants on 
the size of the system (e.g., $/W), rather than on 
its purchase price.  Furthermore, while in some 
instances state PV programs do provide grants to 
system retailers or installers, who in turn pass 
them through to system owners in the form of a 
reduced purchase price, in substance the grant is 
from the PV program (the retailer or installer 
would not have reduced the purchase price 
without having received the grant) and therefore 
the price rebate exclusion is not likely to apply.6
 
Contribution to the Capital of a Corporation:  
Section 118 of the Internal Revenue Code 
excludes from taxable income contributions to 
the capital of a corporation.  This exclusion 
applies to money transferred to a corporation 
(but not other types of businesses, such as LLCs 
or partnerships) by a government unit in order to 
obtain an advantage for the general community, 
rather than for direct services or recompense.  
Moreover, the contribution must, among other 
things:  (1) become a permanent part of the 
recipient’s working capital and not be used for 
paying dividends, interest, or anything else 
chargeable to or payable out of earnings or 
income; (2) be employed in or contribute to the 
 
6 It is also worth noting that taxation cannot be 
avoided by providing grants to retailers or installers, 
rather than system owners.  As shown later in this 
section (in the discussion of the Section 136 
exclusion), the IRS has clearly held that any tax 
liability (or exclusion from tax liability) associated 
with a grant rests with the intended recipient (in this 
case, the system owner), and cannot be shifted to the 
retailer, installer, or any other third party.  Thus, in 
the event that retailers do pass through taxable grants 
to PV system purchasers, both parties are obligated to 
pay income tax on the grant amount (and the system 
purchaser must also increase the basis of the system 
to its full, undiscounted value).  Though at first blush 
this may seem like double taxation, it is no different 
from the more straightforward case in which the 
grant goes to the system purchaser, who pays income 
tax on the grant (but does not reduce basis) and 
provides the retailer with taxable revenue equivalent 
to the full, undiscounted cost of the system. 
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production of additional income to the recipient; 
and (3) be bargained for by the recipient.7   
 
Since, in most cases, a PV grant recipient does 
not “bargain” for the grant,8 and is not obligated 
to use the grant in the manner specified above, 
this exclusion might be difficult to justify.  
Furthermore, given that corporations (as well as 
other commercial entities) are better off with a 
taxable PV grant, it is unclear why a corporation 
would ever even try to make the case that PV 
grants should qualify for the Section 118 
exclusion from taxation.  Instead, a more 
conservative (and, incidentally, lucrative) 
approach would be to simply assume that grants 
are taxable – which, after all, is the default 
position taken by the IRS under Section 61 
(unless otherwise provided in statute). 
 
Since we have heard anecdotally, however, that 
at least some (or perhaps even many) 
corporations in California have, in fact, treated 
PV grants as contributions to capital, we allow 
for this possibility in the analysis presented later 
in this paper. 
 
Utility Energy Conservation Subsidy:  Since 
1991, Section 136 of the Internal Revenue Code 
has treated certain utility energy conservation 
subsidies as non-taxable income.  Specifically, 
Section 136(a) states that “Gross income shall 
not include the value of any subsidy provided 
(directly or indirectly) by a public utility to a 
customer for the purchase or installation of any 
                                                 
                                                
7 General Counsel Memorandum 37354 (December 
21, 1977); Private Letter Ruling 9401035 (October 
14, 1993); Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co (268 U.S. 
628, 1925); Detroit Edison Co. (319 U.S. 98, 1943); 
U.S. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad (412 
U.S. 401, 1973) 
8 This bargaining requirement would, if taken 
literally, appear to be difficult to satisfy in the case of 
most government grants.  Revenue Ruling 93-16 
(1993-1 Cumulative Bulletin 26), however, addressed 
this requirement with respect to FAA grants to airport 
owners.  In that ruling, the IRS deemed the grants to 
be “bargained for” because they were “competitive, 
highly sought after, and made pursuant to meaningful 
criteria and conditions” (Kimberly S. Blanchard, 
“The Taxability of Capital Subsidies and Other 
Targeted Incentives,” Tax Notes, November 8, 1999). 
energy conservation measure.”  Section 
136(c)(1) defines the term “energy conservation 
measure” to mean “any installation or 
modification primarily designed to reduce 
consumption of electricity or natural gas or to 
improve the management of energy demand 
with respect to a dwelling unit.”  This definition 
covers some solar energy systems, presumably 
including PV systems.9   
A key question relating to this exclusion is 
exactly what is meant by “provided (directly or 
indirectly) by a public utility.”  Section 
136(c)(2)(b) defines the term “public utility” to 
mean “a person engaged in the sale of electricity 
or natural gas to residential, commercial, or 
industrial customers for use by such customers.  
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 
“person” includes the Federal Government, a 
State or local government or any political 
subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of 
any of the foregoing.”  Clearly, the 
administrators of most PV programs in the US 
(excepting those administered by utilities) are 
not “engaged in the sale of electricity,” and so 
do not directly qualify as a public utility. 
 
But might such programs be considered to 
indirectly provide energy conservation subsidies 
from a public utility?  In many instances, state 
renewable energy funds (the non-utility 
administrators of most PV programs in the US) 
are financed by utilities or their ratepayers, 
thereby raising the possibility that they are, in 
fact, indirectly providing energy conservation 
subsidies from a public utility.  The conference 
report to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
 
9 Section 210(11) of the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-
619) defines “residential energy conservation 
measures” to include “devices to utilize solar energy 
or windpower for any residential energy conservation 
purpose, including heating of water, space heating 
and cooling…that are warranted by the manufacturer 
to meet a specified level of performance over a 
period of not less than three years.”  The Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, which first implemented Section 
136 of the tax code, appears to have adopted this 
definition (at least according to the conference report 
– the specific adoption or definition does not appear 
to be codified in the Act or in Section 136 of the 
code). 
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however, indicates that Congress inserted the 
“directly or indirectly” phrasing in Section 136 
to prevent third party contractors (e.g., 
equipment vendors, such as PV retailers or 
installers) from taking advantage of the Section 
136 exclusion.  Specifically, it states: 
 
"...the conferees believe that third party 
contractors should not be at a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage 
with respect to the tax benefits provided 
by the exclusion.  In addition, the 
conferees believe that when a utility 
provides a payment to a third party 
contractor, the utility is indirectly 
providing the subsidy to the person for 
whom the contractor is providing the 
energy conservation measure and the 
exclusion should apply to such person.  
Thus, the conference agreement 
provides that the exclusion applies to 
any subsidy provided directly or 
indirectly to a utility customer, if such 
subsidy otherwise would be included in 
income.  For example, if a public utility 
provides a subsidy to a customer to 
partially offset the cost of the 
installation of an energy conservation 
measure on the customer’s premises, the 
provision [Section 136] applies to 
exclude [from taxable income] all or a 
portion of the value of such subsidy.  
Likewise, if the public utility provides a 
payment to an independent contractor so 
that the contractor can provide for the 
installation of an energy conservation 
measure on the utility customer’s 
premises at a reduced price, the [Section 
136] exclusion applies to the customer 
for the indirect subsidy supplied to the 
customer." [Emphasis added.]   
 
One could potentially argue that non-utility 
administrators of PV programs financed by 
utilities or their ratepayers act as “third party 
contractors” for the utilities, and therefore such 
programs’ payments come under the Section 136 
exclusion.  The conference report, however, 
discusses the direct and indirect subsidy only in 
the context of independent contractors (e.g., 
equipment vendors that might otherwise gain “a 
competitive advantage” if provided access to the 
exclusion).  It does not touch on the broader 
issues of program administration or 
governmental subsidies. 
 
Earlier IRS revenue and private letter rulings – 
though on a different statutory provision – do 
address these broader issues, and in some cases 
could be interpreted as indicating that the source 
of a program’s funds would characterize the 
program.10  Subsequently in Private Letter 
Ruling 853004 (April 30, 1985), however, the 
IRS indicated that a subsidy administered by a 
governmental unit would be treated as a 
government program whatever the funding 
source, suggesting that utility-funded, 
government-administered programs would not 
qualify for the Section 136 exclusion.  
Furthermore, the congressional report on the 
subsequent enactment of the Section 136 
exclusion for utility energy conservation 
subsidies contains no express repudiation of the 
IRS' previous position on government subsidies.  
One might, therefore, expect the IRS to stick to 
its position taken in Private Letter Ruling 
853004 that characterizes a government-
administered program as a government program, 
regardless of the funding source.11
 
Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains over the 
scope of the exclusion provided under Section 
136 as it relates to state PV programs.  
Specifically, some of the rulings cited above – 
which, it should be noted, concerned credits and 
statutory provisions somewhat different from 
those of interest here – conflict with one another, 
and only address this issue peripherally (i.e., in 
commentary not necessary to the legal holding 
of the case).  Furthermore, private letter rulings 
hold limited precedential value.  Finally, 
administrators of PV rebate programs 
                                                 
10 See Revenue Ruling 81-52 (1981-1 Cumulative 
Bulletin 9); Revenue Ruling 83-145 (1983-2 
Cumulative Bulletin 14); and Private Letter Ruling 
8342047 (July 18, 1983). 
11 It is less clear how the IRS might characterize 
programs funded by utilities (or their ratepayers) but 
administered by non-utility, non-governmental 
entities (e.g., non-profit administrators, such as the 
Energy Trust of Oregon). 
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throughout the U.S. fall into many different 
classifications (e.g., governmental, quasi-
governmental, non-profit, and utility), further 
complicating attempts at broad-brush analysis.  
Individual PV programs seeking clarity on this 
issue will likely need to consult with the IRS. 
 
Summary:  In summary, though it is difficult to 
generalize, given the highly factual nature of the 
law surrounding this issue, it appears that grants 
made to commercial PV systems will, in most 
cases, likely not qualify for any of the four 
exclusions discussed above, and will therefore 
be considered taxable grants that do not reduce 
the project’s basis to which the federal ITC and 
depreciation applies.  The one potential (though 
perhaps unlikely) exception would be if PV 
grants to corporations were determined by the 
IRS to be contributions to capital under Section 
118, in which case corporations – but not other 
types of businesses, such as partnerships or 
LLCs – would need to exclude the grants from 
gross income, and reduce the project’s tax basis 
by the amount of the grant.  The taxability of 
grants made to residential PV systems will vary 
based on whether those grants are administered 
as a utility program under Section 136, with 
some uncertainty as to what exactly constitutes a 
“utility” program.12  To reflect this outstanding 
uncertainty, our analysis below allows for the 
possibility of either taxable or non-taxable 
grants to both residential and commercial 
systems. 
 
Analysis 
 
To examine the potential value of EPAct’s new 
and expanded PV tax credits, we developed a 
cash flow model of a PV system in a generic 
state that offers a buy-down grant (either taxable 
or non-taxable) of $4/W.13  Our approach was to 
                                                 
                                                                        
12 Section 136 does not apply to commercial systems, 
and so cannot be used to argue for tax-exempt 
treatment of grants to such systems.  Though Section 
136 originally included – with limitations – 
commercial energy conservation measures as well, 
these were ultimately stripped out by the Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996. 
13 Other assumptions include:  a cash-financed 
system with a 25-year project life; some economies 
determine how much this $4/W grant could be 
reduced, given EPAct’s new or expanded PV tax 
credits, such that the PV system purchaser 
would remain indifferent (between pre- and 
post-EPAct conditions) in terms of the net 
present value of after-tax cash flows.  The size 
of the reduction can be thought of not only as 
the maximum amount by which a PV program 
could reduce the size of its grants without 
causing the after-tax economics of PV to 
deteriorate (relative to pre-EPAct conditions), 
but also as the maximum value of the EPAct 
credits, on a grant-equivalent, $/W basis.   
 
The resulting values for systems sized between 1 
and 20 kW are shown in Figure 1.  For 1 kW 
residential systems, the new EPAct ITC provides 
the same value as a non-taxable grant of $1.9/W 
(or a taxable grant of $2.7/W).14  This value, 
however, drops precipitously to around $0.5/W 
non-taxable (or $0.7/W taxable) for 4 kW 
 
of scale in installed costs ($10/W at 1 kW, $9/W at 2 
kW, $8.5/W at 6 kW, and $8.2/W at 20 kW, with 
linear interpolation between these points); 15.4% 
capacity factor (i.e., 1350 kWh/kW/year); $0.12/kWh 
avoided electricity cost, escalating at 3%/year 
(treated as taxable income for commercial, but not 
residential, systems); no state tax credits; state 
depreciation follows federal (i.e., 5-year MACRS); 
federal ITC reduces basis for federal depreciation by 
half of the ITC (i.e., 15%); federal ITC does not 
reduce basis for state depreciation; tax brackets of 
28% (federal residential), 34% (federal commercial), 
and 8% (state residential and commercial); $4/W 
grant is either taxable or non-taxable at both the 
federal and state level; state income tax payments are 
deductible from federal income; and a 7% nominal 
discount rate. 
14 The fact that the taxable grant-equivalent value is 
higher than the non-taxable grant-equivalent value 
should not be interpreted to mean that a residential 
system owner is better off with a taxable grant; 
indeed, as described earlier at the beginning of the 
tax analysis section, the opposite is true.  Instead, this 
taxable/non-taxable differential is due to the fact that 
a taxable grant represents pre-tax income, whereas a 
non-taxable grant represents after-tax income.  
Reducing the size of a taxable grant (e.g., in response 
to EPAct) reduces the recipient’s tax liability without 
impacting the value of the EPAct credit; this 
reduction in tax liability, in turn, allows a further 
reduction in grant size (a positive feedback) relative 
to a non-taxable grant. 
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systems, and to $0.2/W non-taxable (or $0.3 
taxable) at 10 kW.  This decay in value as 
system size increases is due to the $2000 cap on 
the credit, which contributes an increasingly 
smaller proportion of total costs as system size 
increases.  Because the 30% commercial ITC is 
not similarly capped, its value (relative to the 
10% ITC available previously) remains fairly 
constant across different system sizes (even 
much larger system sizes than shown – e.g., 250 
kW), equivalent to a taxable grant of just over 
$2.00/W (or non-taxable grant of just over 
$1.50/W).  Finally, EPAct’s PV tax credits 
provide no value to tax-exempt entities, to those 
subject to the alternative minimum tax, or to 
entities with no tax liability for other reasons. 
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commercial grants, our results are not dependent 
on our baseline assumption of a $4/W grant (vs. 
a $2/W grant, for example).  In the case of a 
taxable grant, the size of the grant is immaterial 
(at least for this purpose), as it does not reduce 
the project’s basis, and therefore does not impact 
the incremental value of the ITC or depreciation.  
In the case of a residential non-taxable grant, the 
ITC is almost always (except for the smallest 
systems) capped at $2000 – even after reducing 
the project’s basis by the grant amount – so 
again the size of the grant that we have assumed 
is, for the most part, immaterial to our results.  
Commercial non-taxable grants, however, will 
impact the size of the uncapped ITC, meaning 
that our results for this special (though perhaps 
unlikely) case will vary depending on the grant 
size assumed. 
 
 
 
R
important implications 
p
 
For PV system purchasers, it is clear from 
Figure 1 that the economic value of EPAct’s 
n
dependent on system size as well as the type and 
tax status of the system owner.  Commercial PV 
system owners with tax liability will benefit 
greatly from the expanded ITC, as will owners 
of small residential systems from the new 
residential ITC.  On the other hand, larger 
residential systems and systems owned by 
entities with limited or no tax liability (e.g., 
municipalities, non-profits) will gain little from 
the EPAct credits.  These differences will no 
doubt affect the nature of consumer demand for 
PV while the credits are in effect:  home-owners 
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entities with limited or no tax liability may 
increasingly choose third-party ownership to 
indirectly capture the benefits of these new 
credits. 
 
At the same time, EPAct’s credits may not 
ultimately be worth as much as the maximum 
values p 15resented in Figure 1,  because PV 
rograms could, in effect, reclaim some or all of 
 be ideal for a 
umber of reasons.  Worldwide demand for 
                                                
p
EPAct’s value (while still leaving system 
purchasers no worse off than before EPAct) by 
reducing the size of grants offered.  Reducing 
grant size would help to stretch program budgets 
over a larger number of PV installations, without 
unduly suppressing growth in the market.  
Furthermore, by targeting any reductions at 
those specific system sizes and types that stand 
to benefit the most from EPAct – e.g., 
commercial and small residential systems – 
program administrators may help to level the 
playing field and ensure that EPAct does not 
favor certain market segments (e.g., commercial 
and small residential systems) while 
disadvantaging others (e.g., tax-exempt and 
large residential systems). 
 
Reducing grant size – even in a targeted fashion 
– by the maximum amounts represented in 
Figure 1, however, may not
n
solar modules and the increase in the cost of 
silicon feedstock have pushed PV module costs 
higher.  Program administrators may wish to let 
the new and expanded federal credits offset this 
price increase, and perhaps even go a bit further 
to boost return on investment and thereby 
stimulate additional demand for PV.  
Furthermore, EPAct’s tax credits may not be 
perceived by consumers to be as valuable as a 
grant that reduces up-front cash outlays.  Finally, 
unless extended, EPAct’s new and expanded PV 
 
  
ew Jersey has cut the size of its PV grants by 
15 It should be emphasized that the analysis presented 
in this paper is generic (i.e., not state-specific), and 
that outcomes will differ in individual states that 
offer state tax incentives, or present other 
complexities.  State-specific analysis is required to 
determine the true value of EPAct tax credits under 
any specific PV program.  Footnote 1, for example, 
provides citations for analysis conducted specifically 
for California’s PV program administrators. 
tax credits will expire in just two years.  In part 
as a result of these factors, the Solar Energy 
Industries Association (SEIA) has recommended 
that any reduction in rebate levels not exceed 
50% of the estimated value of the Federal ITC.16
 
To our knowledge, only three PV programs have 
so far reduced their PV grant levels in response 
to EPAct’s new and expanded federal credits.
N
$0.80-1.10/W (depending on system size), 
though system owners that demonstrate an 
inability to utilize EPAct’s credits will be 
subject to far more modest cuts of $0.15-
0.20/W.  The Energy Trust of Oregon – 
responding not only to EPAct, but also to an 
increased state PV tax credit taking effect in 
2006 – has similarly cut its incentive by roughly 
$1.00/W across the board.  Finally, Wisconsin 
has eliminated grants for systems smaller than 
0.5 kW (which, as suggested by Figure 1, reap 
the most value from EPAct), and has reduced 
grants to other systems (except those owned by 
tax-exempt entities) by $0.50/kWh of estimated 
annual production (which equates to roughly 
$0.65/W at a 15% capacity factor).  In 
comparison to the maximum incremental value 
of the EPAct credits presented in Figure 1, each 
of these reductions is relatively modest (except 
with respect to larger residential systems).  
Other PV programs have considered reducing 
the size of their PV grants, but have so far not 
acted.17
 
                                                 
16 In addition, SEIA recommends that the total 
program budget be maintained (i.e., so that the 
a surge in demand for its grants – the entire 
program is able to support a greater number PV 
systems at the reduced grant level), that any 
reductions in grant size be made in such a way as to 
not degrade the economics for any customer class 
(i.e., use differentiated incentives), and that changes 
be made in a transparent and forward-looking 
fashion. 
17 At least one such program has, perhaps as a result, 
reported 
2006 funding for PG&E’s Self-Generation Incentive 
Program in California was over-subscribed by early 
February of that year.  Oversubscription of grants 
available from California’s other investor-owned 
utilities is likely to follow. 
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Our findings also have important implications 
inally, the fact that residential system owners 
for policy design, and the type of incentive 
offered.  Specifically, many PV programs 
(including California’s new $3.2 billion, 11-year 
solar initiative) are considering shifting from 
capacity-based incentives (i.e., the $/W grants 
described in this paper) to performance-based 
incentives (i.e., $/kWh payments over time), at 
least in part based on the belief that capacity-
based incentives reduce the project’s basis to 
which federal tax credits and depreciation apply, 
making them less valuable than performance-
based incentives, which do not reduce basis.  As 
shown in this report, however, capacity-based 
incentives will only reduce tax basis if they are 
non-taxable, which in many cases appears 
unlikely (particularly for commercial systems) 
given the tax analysis presented above.  As such, 
though there may be good reasons for shifting to 
performance-based incentives, maximizing the 
value of federal tax credits may not be among 
them. 
 
F
benefit most from non-taxable grants (while 
commercial owners prefer taxable grants) has 
implications for PV program administration.  
Where possible, new PV incentive programs for 
residential customers would ideally be 
administered in a way so that non-taxable grants 
can be provided (e.g., by utilities that fall under 
the Section 136 exclusion).  Within existing 
programs, administrators may want to seek 
clarification from the IRS – perhaps using 
arguments that capitalize on some of the 
uncertainties presented in this report – that their 
residential (but not commercial) incentives are 
non-taxable. 
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production. This represents a new trend towards aggressive state support for clean energy, but few efforts have 
been made to report and share the early experiences of these funds.   
 
This paper is part of a series of clean energy fund case studies prepared by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory and the Clean Energy States Alliance.  The primary purpose of this case study series is to report on 
the innovative programs and administrative practices of state (and some international) clean energy funds, to 
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useful for clean energy funds and other stakeholders that are interested in learning about the pioneering 
renewable energy efforts of newly established clean energy funds.  To access or download all the case studies, 
see:  http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/ or http://www.cleanenergystates.org/
 
ABOUT THE CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 
 
The Clean Energy States Alliance (CESA) is a non-profit initiative funded by members and foundations to 
support the state clean energy funds.  CESA collects and disseminates information and analysis, conducts 
original research, and helps to coordinate activities of the state funds. The main purpose of CESA is to help 
states increase the quality and quantity of clean energy investments and to expand the clean energy market. The 
Clean Energy Group manages CESA, while Berkeley Lab provides CESA with analytic support. 
 
CONTACT THE MANAGERS OF THE CASE STUDY SERIES 
 
Ryan Wiser Mark Bolinger Lewis Milford 
Berkeley Lab Berkeley Lab Clean Energy Group 
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